Seven Years of Pashinyan: Armenias Fragile „Revolutions“ of Small Steps (Part 2)

Following the bloody resurgence of Armenia’s decades-long conflict with Azerbaijan between 2020 and 2023, today’s situation appears not only peaceful, but is even marked by significant historic steps toward a negotiated settlement. However, the situation remains fragile, and many obstacles and unanswered questions persist, making the conflict still the greatest impediment to the country’s development and, at the same time, potentially decisive for Prime Minister Pashinyan’s political fate.
After the first part of this article, covering Armenia’s trajectory since the Velvet Revolution, has focused on the ambiguous foreign policy reorientation and the shift towards the EU, this part will look at Pashinyan’s domestically contested reconciliatory approach to the peace process with Azerbaijan, as well as the question to what extent the promise of democratization has been realized.

The progress achieved must be attributed to Pashinyan’s persistent and pragmatic course, marked by his willingness to make immense concessions. In a largely overlooked yet equally historic development, he is also making continuous efforts to normalize relations with Türkiye, which he likewise sees as a prerequisite for stability and further democratic and economic development. Relations between the two countries are historically fraught, with closed land borders and the absence of diplomatic relations. This is largely shaped by the Genocide of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire between 1915 and 1923, Türkiye’s ongoing refusal to recognize this, as well as its close relationship with Azerbaijan. However, there is at least a small hope that the normalisation process could lead in the coming months to the opening of the land borders, which have been closed since 1993. Under his so-called “Real Armenia” doctrine, Pashinyan calls for abandoning dreams of a “Historic Armenia”, including claims to formerly Armenian territories in Türkiye, and has declared the return of displaced Armenians to Karabakh impossible. He also advocates overcoming historical divisions in the region, which he claims were created by the Soviet Union. Even if all this should not obscure the injustice suffered by the civilian population and those displaced from Karabakh, Pashinyan ultimately appears to be voicing unpopular truths. Much of his action indeed seems almost unavoidable, given the limited options of a small country constantly threatened by powerful neighbours.
Pashinyan, the farsighted figure who makes painful yet necessary decisions, opts for dialogue and is willing to accept unpopularity for his country’s long-term benefit? In Armenia, this narrative finds little sympathy. Criticism is not only loud among those clinging to nationalist illusions, particularly within pro-Russian, nationalist forces and strongly within the diaspora, but also among democratic opposition actors. Hardly surprising, given that his reconciliatory course even went so far as to make a series of ahistorical statements, in which he portrayed the Karabakh national movement as a Soviet project or appeared to relativize the Armenian Genocide as well as the bizarre decision to remove Mount Ararat from the Armenian passport, the country’s national symbol, which is today located on Turkish territory,

Some of this criticism appears justified, yet sometimes detached from political reality. Many argue that Armenia is allowing the terms of an agreement to be dictated at any cost, while abandoning any pursuit of justice or accountability, as seen in the absence of a resolution for remaining Armenian prisoners or the unaddressed rights of displaced Karabakh Armenians in the peace agreement draft. Such a peace would be symbolic and political but ultimately unjust, unable to serve as a foundation for lasting stability, and potentially setting a dangerous precedent by encouraging the stronger rival to pursue further territorial claims through force. At least there is widespread fear in Armenian society that Azerbaijan may interpret concessions as a sign of weakness and use current agreements as leverage, reflected in great mistrust with reportedly just 30 % of Armenians believing in real peace resulting from the current peace process.

Indeed, grounded doubts remain to what extent Azerbaijan is genuinely interested in a long-term peaceful solution. Not least because Aliyev and the Azeri state media continue to employ aggressive and irredentist rhetoric, including a state-initiated campaign that refers to Armenia as Western Azerbaijan, but also because they repeatedly imposed additional conditions, effectively stalling the process.

Has the promise of the Revolution fulfilled?

Seven years after the Revolution, and with just a few months to go before the elections, Armenia’s democratic trajectory remains highly fragile. There is no doubt that under Pashinyan, the country has undergone a fundamental transformation, standing today with free elections, press freedom, a decline in politically motivated violence, and lower levels of corruption. Yet the democratization sparked by the 2018 revolution remains incomplete, many hopes for far-reaching reforms – particularly in the judiciary – have so far gone unfulfilled. Given the internal and external challenges, a rapid and complete consolidation as liberal democracy could hardly be expected and stalled reform process can also be explained by a number of deep-seated structural problems. However, local online media outlet Civil Net is accusing the government of worrying signs of democratic regression in front of the election, reporting about increasing co-optation of NGOs or the usage of state resources for election campaigning. For some critics, disillusionment after the 2018 Revolution began early on, for example with Pashinyan’s installation of loyal judges.
Alongside persistent social issues, Armenia’s democracy continues to face numerous structural challenges, from deep polarization, weak institutions, a difficult situation for independent media and NGOs, to limited party pluralism and a political culture that still seems to remain heavily centered on a single leader. In times of crisis, Armenia’s internal conflicts and problems tend to be neglected, not only in Western media coverage, but also from the government itself, as the overarching issue of national security dominates the agenda. A focus that conveniently serves to justify the marginalization of domestic issues and signs of democratic regress: While Pashinyan is increasingly celebrated in Western countries as the remaining democratic beacon in the South Caucasus, his own domestic course has at times called the democratic legacy into question: A populist style of governance, characterized by a concentration and personalization of power, as well as worrying cases of  political instrumentalization of the judiciary, interference in local elections, corruption, or, most recently, allegedly politically motivated arrests of opposition figures.

The governments ongoing conflict with the Armenian Apostolic Church, which has shaken Armenian society over the past year, escalated with the arrest of a high-ranking clergyman, who allegedly plotted a coup against the government. While parts of the Church reproduce pro-Russian narratives and maintain close ties with economic elites, Pashinyan’s confrontational stance still raises questions about a politically motivated campaign, and further fuels his rivals’ growing narrative, claiming that he is pursuing anti-Armenian or anti-Christian policies. And while his somewhat cryptic Instagram content is gaining him growing international popularity, his erratic, sometimes harsh and combative rhetoric certainly does not help to ease social polarization,

A fateful election in 2026

Armenia is facing a heated election year. It is unclear to what scale Russian interference will occur, but it is plausible that significant efforts will be mobilized to prevent Pashinyan’s re-election, not least in order to sabotage the peace process, as this would likely weaken Russia’s role in the region. Local NGOs are already reporting a sharp increase in Russian disinformation campaigns, and the Armenian government has reportedly requested the EU’s support to counter expected foreign hybrid interference in the elections.
The elections are likely to become a power struggle between old and new elites and to take place in a quite unhealthy constellation: The increasingly unpopular Pashinyan and his ruling party, Civil Contract, facing a weak opposition that many do not regard as a genuine alternative, as it is dominated by the two former authoritarian presidents. This constitutes fertile ground for even greater polarization, and the prospects for those who hope for a continued pro-Western course, but also democratic reforms seem rather bleak.
The elections will also be an important test for Armenia’s young democracy itself, which has not yet demonstrated its ability to undergo a peaceful transfer of power since 2018.