{"id":13013,"date":"2025-12-28T19:02:40","date_gmt":"2025-12-28T18:02:40","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blogs.uni-bremen.de\/europablog\/?p=13013"},"modified":"2025-12-28T22:17:39","modified_gmt":"2025-12-28T21:17:39","slug":"seven-years-of-pashinyan-armenias-fragile-revolutions-of-small-steps-part-2","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.uni-bremen.de\/europablog\/2025\/12\/28\/seven-years-of-pashinyan-armenias-fragile-revolutions-of-small-steps-part-2\/","title":{"rendered":"Seven Years of Pashinyan: Armenias Fragile „Revolutions“ of Small Steps (Part 2)"},"content":{"rendered":"
\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t

Following the bloody resurgence of Armenia's decades-long conflict with Azerbaijan between 2020 and 2023, today\u2019s situation appears not only peaceful, but is even marked by significant historic steps toward a negotiated settlement. However, the situation remains fragile, and many obstacles and unanswered questions persist, making the conflict still the greatest impediment to the country\u2019s development and, at the same time, potentially decisive for Prime Minister Pashinyan\u2019s political fate.
After the first part of this article<\/a>, covering Armenia's trajectory since the Velvet Revolution, has focused on the ambiguous foreign policy reorientation and the shift towards the EU, this part will look at Pashinyan's domestically contested reconciliatory approach to the peace process with Azerbaijan, as well as the question to what extent the promise of democratization has been realized.<\/p>\n

<\/div>\n\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t<\/div>

\n\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t

Only two years after coming to power in the wake of the revolution, Pashinyan\u2019s government itself was confronted with massive protests<\/a>. His handling of the Karabakh war sparked waves of outrage, as he was widely blamed for Armenia\u2019s defeat and later accused of treason for \u201csurrendering\u201d Nagorno-Karabakh. Nevertheless, Pashinyan has so far managed to survive the political pressure<\/a>, and the ongoing process of rapprochement with Azerbaijan appears to be making significant progress<\/a>. Under considerable international attention, Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev signed a seven-point declaration in Washington D.C. in August 2025, widely seen as a historic success and a sign of hope<\/a>. The talks also addressed a key demand by Azerbaijan for a land corridor through southern Armenia to its Nakhichevan exclave,<\/a> which is to be operated by a private U.S. company. But on many issues, the agreements remained vague and, contrary to Trump\u2019s claims<\/a>, are still far from constituting a genuine solution<\/a> as the peace agreement itself remains to be signed.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

<\/div>\n\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t<\/div>

\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t

Nagorno-Karabakh conflict<\/strong><\/p>\n

The long-running conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh had reignited in September 2020, when Azerbaijan launched an attack on the Armenian-populated enclave, controlled by the self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh since the first Karabakh War between 1988 until 1994. After six weeks of fighting, Azerbaijani forces, with substantial military support from T\u00fcrkiye, regained control of seven territories in and around Nagorno-Karabakh. A Russian-brokered ceasefire was repeatedly violated by Azerbaijan, including serious incursions into Armenian territory in 2021 and 2022.
After Azerbaijan's nine-month blockade of the Lachin Corridor,<\/a> the only land link between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, causing a serious humanitarian situation, it launched a new offensive in September 2023. It resulted in seizing control of the entire territory within a day, the exodus of over 100,000 ethnic Armenians, effectively cleansing the region of its Armenian population, and the dissolution of the Republic of Artsakh. The defeat became a national trauma for Armenia, which also faced the challenge of handling the thousand refugees displaced from Karabakh.<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t<\/div>

\n\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t

The progress achieved must be attributed to Pashinyan\u2019s persistent and pragmatic course, marked by his willingness to make immense concessions. In a largely overlooked yet equally historic development, he is also making continuous efforts to normalize relations with T\u00fcrkiye<\/a>, which he likewise sees as a prerequisite for stability and further democratic and economic development. Relations between the two countries are historically fraught, with closed land borders and the absence of diplomatic relations. This is largely shaped by the Genocide of Armenians<\/a> in the Ottoman Empire between 1915 and 1923, T\u00fcrkiye's ongoing refusal to recognize this, as well as its close relationship with Azerbaijan. However, there is at least a small hope that the normalisation process could lead in the coming months to the opening of the land borders<\/a>, which have been closed since 1993. Under his so-called\u00a0\u201cReal Armenia\u201d doctrine<\/a>, Pashinyan calls for abandoning dreams of a \u201cHistoric Armenia\u201d, including claims to formerly Armenian territories in T\u00fcrkiye, and has declared the return of displaced Armenians to Karabakh impossible. He also advocates overcoming historical divisions in the region, which he claims were created by the Soviet Union<\/a>. Even if all this should not obscure the injustice suffered by the civilian population and those displaced from Karabakh, Pashinyan ultimately appears to be voicing unpopular truths. Much of his action indeed seems almost unavoidable, given the limited options of a small country constantly threatened by powerful neighbours.
Pashinyan, the farsighted figure who makes painful yet necessary decisions, opts for dialogue and is willing to accept unpopularity for his country\u2019s long-term benefit? In Armenia, this narrative finds little sympathy. Criticism is not only loud among those clinging to nationalist illusions, particularly within pro-Russian, nationalist forces and strongly within the diaspora, but also among democratic <\/a>opposition actors<\/a>. Hardly surprising, given that his reconciliatory course even went so far as to make a series of ahistorical statements, in which he portrayed the Karabakh national movement as a Soviet project<\/a> or appeared to\u00a0relativize the Armenian Genocide<\/a> as well as the bizarre decision to remove Mount Ararat from the Armenian passport<\/a>, the country\u2019s national symbol, which is today located on Turkish territory,<\/p>\n

<\/div>\n\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t<\/div>

\n\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\"\"<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/div>
\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t
Protest with the flags of Armenia and the Republic of Artsakh.<\/strong><\/p>\n

<\/div>\n\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t<\/div>

\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t

Some of this criticism appears justified, yet sometimes detached from political reality. Many argue that Armenia is allowing the terms of an agreement to be dictated at any cost, while abandoning any pursuit of justice or accountability, as seen in the absence of a resolution for remaining Armenian prisoners or the unaddressed rights of displaced Karabakh Armenians in the peace agreement draft. Such a peace would be symbolic and political but ultimately unjust, unable to serve as a foundation for lasting stability<\/a>, and potentially setting a dangerous precedent by encouraging the stronger rival to pursue further territorial claims through force. At least there is widespread fear in Armenian society that Azerbaijan may interpret concessions as a sign of weakness and use current agreements as leverage, reflected in great mistrust with reportedly just 30 % of Armenians believing in real peace resulting from the current peace process.<\/a><\/p>\n

<\/div>\n\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t<\/div>

\n\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t

Indeed, grounded doubts remain to what extent Azerbaijan is genuinely interested in a long-term peaceful solution. Not least because Aliyev and the Azeri state media continue to employ aggressive and irredentist rhetoric<\/a>, including a state-initiated campaign that refers to Armenia as Western Azerbaijan,<\/a> but also because they repeatedly imposed additional conditions, effectively stalling the process.<\/a><\/p><\/div>\n\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t<\/div>

\n\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t

Has the promise of the Revolution fulfilled?<\/span>
<\/strong><\/p>\n

Seven years after the Revolution, and with just a few months to go before the elections, Armenia\u2019s democratic trajectory remains highly fragile. There is no doubt that under Pashinyan, the country has undergone a fundamental transformation<\/a>, standing today with free elections, press freedom, a decline in politically motivated violence, and lower levels of corruption. Yet the democratization sparked by the 2018 revolution remains incomplete, many hopes for far-reaching reforms - particularly in the judiciary<\/a> - have so far gone unfulfilled.<\/a> Given the internal and external challenges, a rapid and complete consolidation as liberal democracy could hardly be expected and stalled reform process can also be explained by a number of deep-seated structural problems. However, local online media outlet Civil Net is accusing the government of worrying signs of democratic regression<\/a> in front of the election, reporting about increasing co-optation of NGOs or the usage of state resources for election campaigning. For some critics, disillusionment after the 2018 Revolution began early on, for example with Pashinyan's installation of loyal judges.
<\/strong>Alongside persistent social issues, Armenia\u2019s democracy continues to face numerous structural challenges<\/a>, from deep polarization, weak institutions, a difficult situation for independent media and NGOs,<\/a> to limited party pluralism and a political culture that still seems to remain heavily centered on a single leader. In times of crisis, Armenia\u2019s internal conflicts and problems tend to be neglected, not only in Western media coverage, but also from the government itself, as the overarching issue of national security dominates the agenda. A focus that conveniently serves to justify the marginalization of domestic issues and signs of democratic regress:<\/a> While Pashinyan is increasingly celebrated in Western countries as the remaining democratic beacon in the South Caucasus, his own domestic course has at times called the democratic legacy into question: A populist style of governance<\/a>, characterized by a concentration and personalization of power,<\/a> as well as worrying cases of\u00a0 political instrumentalization of the judiciary<\/a>, interference in local elections, <\/a>corruption, <\/a>or, most recently, allegedly politically motivated arrests of opposition figures<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The governments ongoing conflict with the Armenian Apostolic Church<\/a>, which has shaken Armenian society over the past year, escalated with the arrest of a high-ranking clergyman,<\/a> who allegedly plotted a coup against the government. While parts of the Church reproduce pro-Russian narratives and maintain close ties with economic elites, Pashinyan's confrontational stance still raises questions about a politically motivated campaign, and further fuels his rivals\u2019 growing narrative, claiming that he is pursuing anti-Armenian or anti-Christian policies<\/a>. And while his somewhat cryptic Instagram content<\/a> is gaining him growing international popularity, his erratic, sometimes harsh and combative rhetoric<\/a> certainly does not help to ease social polarization,<\/p>\n

<\/div>\n\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t<\/div>

\n\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t

A fateful election in 2026<\/b><\/span><\/p>\n

Armenia is facing a heated election year. It is unclear to what scale Russian interference will occur, but it is plausible that significant efforts will be mobilized to prevent Pashinyan\u2019s re-election, not least in order to sabotage the peace process, as this would likely weaken Russia\u2019s role in the region. Local NGOs are already reporting a sharp increase in Russian disinformation campaigns<\/a>, and the Armenian government has reportedly requested the EU's support to counter expected foreign hybrid interference<\/a> in the elections.
The elections are likely to become a power struggle between old and new elites and to take place in a quite unhealthy constellation: The increasingly unpopular Pashinyan and his ruling party, Civil Contract, facing a weak opposition that many do not regard as a genuine alternative, as it is dominated by the two former authoritarian presidents. This constitutes fertile ground for even greater polarization, and the prospects for those who hope for a continued pro-Western course, but also democratic reforms seem rather bleak.
The elections will also be an important test for Armenia's young democracy itself, which has not yet demonstrated its ability to undergo a peaceful transfer of power since 2018.<\/p>\n

<\/div>\n\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t<\/div>

\n\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t
<\/div><\/div>
\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t

Sources:<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Armenia after 2018<\/a><\/p>\n

Systemic Democratic Change? Armenia\u2019s Achievements and Shortcomings since the Velvet Revolution | Heinrich B\u00f6ll Stiftung | Tbilisi - South Caucasus Region<\/a><\/p>\n

The European Endowment for Democracy (EED) | Armenia: Civil society and independent media safeguard democratic values in advent of 2026 elections<\/a><\/p>\n

Professor Kopalyan auf X: \u201eA thread \ud83e\uddf5on the US-Armenia transit route agreement, the US-led Armenia-Azerbaijan normalization initiative, and how this configures into Armenia's security architecture.\u201c \/ X<\/a><\/p>\n

Armenia and Azerbaijan\u2019s Major Step Forward | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace<\/a><\/p>\n

Historic Breakthrough for Peace in the South Caucasus? - Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung<\/a><\/p>\n

Armenia's Election Is a Foreign Affair | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace<\/a><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Additional Links:<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Nagorno-Karabakh: Conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenians explained<\/a><\/p>\n

Eskalation in Bergkarabach. Was geschieht und warum ist es wichtig? | EuropaBlog<\/a><\/p>\n

<\/div>\n\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The second part of this article about Armenia’s trajectory since 2018, explores Pashinyan’s peace efforts with Azerbaijan and the incomplete democratization under his reign. <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":15239,"featured_media":13047,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_bbp_topic_count":0,"_bbp_reply_count":0,"_bbp_total_topic_count":0,"_bbp_total_reply_count":0,"_bbp_voice_count":0,"_bbp_anonymous_reply_count":0,"_bbp_topic_count_hidden":0,"_bbp_reply_count_hidden":0,"_bbp_forum_subforum_count":0,"_et_pb_use_builder":"on","_et_pb_old_content":"","_et_gb_content_width":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[207,1013642,1013704],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-13013","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-allgemein","category-armenien","category-maxim-von-luecken"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.uni-bremen.de\/europablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13013","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.uni-bremen.de\/europablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.uni-bremen.de\/europablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.uni-bremen.de\/europablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/15239"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.uni-bremen.de\/europablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=13013"}],"version-history":[{"count":16,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.uni-bremen.de\/europablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13013\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":13286,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.uni-bremen.de\/europablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13013\/revisions\/13286"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.uni-bremen.de\/europablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/13047"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.uni-bremen.de\/europablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=13013"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.uni-bremen.de\/europablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=13013"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.uni-bremen.de\/europablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=13013"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}